United Nations S/2012/800

Security Council

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15 November 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 28 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and in reference to the agreement on a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha, and following my letters to you dated 25 and 27 October 2012, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of violations of the ceasefire committed by armed terrorist groups on 28 October 2012 up to 1400 hours (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-59237 (E) 261112 271112

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 28 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

List of attacks and violations carried out by the armed terrorist groups between 2000 hours on 27 October 2012 and 1400 hours on 28 October 2012

No.	*Place*	*Time*	*Constituents of armed terrorist group*	*Act carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1	Rif Dimashq	2010	Armed terrorist group	The Jubbah checkpoint in the Qalamun area came under fire		Fire was returned
2		2030	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards law enforcement checkpoints in Artuz	One vehicle was hit by gunfire	
3		2030	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards law enforcement forces to the north of Jub'adin		Fire was returned
4		2120	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces were attacked in Harasta		Fire was returned
5		2130	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Shab'a		Fire was returned
6		2300	Armed terrorist group	The Zamalka-Qalamun underpass checkpoint came under fire		Fire was returned
7		0140	Armed terrorist group	The law enforcement checkpoint in front of the Mustafa mosque in Sawwan came under fire	One law enforcement officer was killed	Fire was returned
8		0200	Armed terrorist group	A mortar was launched towards a law enforcement checkpoint in the Qalamun area		
9		0817	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Nabk, Mashrafah, Zabadani and Nashabiyah		

No.	Place	Time	Constituents of armed terrorist group	Act carried out by armed terrorist group	Outcome	Remarks
10		1000	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device was detonated and a law enforcement detachment came under fire in the Dayr Atiyah area		
11		1020	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Harmalah and Malihah		
12	Homs	2030	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in the city of Tall Kalakh		Fire was returned
13	Hama	2045	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards a law enforcement checkpoint in the Ghab area		
14		2130	Armed terrorist group	The Barudiyah law enforcement checkpoint in the city of Hama came under fire		
15	Aleppo	2220	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Bab Antakiyah and three mortar shells were launched towards residential buildings in Bustan al-Qasr		Fire was returned
16		0100	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces came under fire from various types of weapon in Khan al-Asal		Fire was returned
17		0530	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces in the Blarlirmun area on the Aleppo-I'zaz road came under fire from various types of weapon		Fire was returned
18		0730	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement forces barracks in Aleppo was targeted	One law enforcement officer was injured	Fire was returned
19		1000	Armed terrorist groups	Nahiyat al-Zarbah came under fire from machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and sniper fire		Fire was returned

No.	*Place*	*Time*	*Constituents of armed terrorist group*	*Act carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
20		1300	Armed terrorist group	A locally manufactured missile was fired towards the municipality building in the city of Aleppo	The building sustained material damage	
21	Idlib	0700	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces were attacked in the Hamidiyah and Ma'arrah areas, Harim, Salqin, the village of Allanah and in Jabal al-Duwali	Several law enforcement officers were killed and injured	Fire was returned
22	Dayr al-Zawr	0600	Armed terrorist group	An oil pipeline was blown up in Abu Kamal		



United Nations S/2012/801

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 28 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and in reference to the agreement on a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha, and following my letters to you dated 26, 27 and 28 October 2012, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of all violations of the ceasefire committed by armed terrorist groups from 8 p.m. on 27 October to 8 p.m. on 28 October (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-59250 (E) 261112 291112

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 28 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

List of attacks and violations carried out by the armed terrorist groups between 2000 hours on 27 October 2012 and 2000 hours on 28 October 2012

No.	*Place*	*Time*	*Composition of armed terrorist group*	*Act carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1	Damascus	1415	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device was detonated in the Masakin Barzah area	One law enforcement officer was wounded	
2	Rif Dimashq	2010	Armed terrorist group	The Jubbah checkpoint in the Qalamun area came under fire		Fire was returned
3		2030	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards law enforcement checkpoints in Artuz	One vehicle was hit	
4		2030	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards law enforcement personnel to the north of Jab'adin		Fire was returned
5		2130	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces in Harasta were attacked		Fire was returned
6		2130	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement checkpoints in Shab'a came under fire		Fire was returned
7		2300	Armed terrorist group	The checkpoint at the Zamalka-Qabun underpass came under fire		Fire was returned
8		0140	Armed terrorist group	The law enforcement checkpoint in front of the Mustapha mosque in Tall Sawwan came under fire	One law enforcement officer was killed	Fire was returned
9		0200	Armed terrorist group	A mortar was launched towards a law enforcement checkpoint in the Qalamun area		

No.	Place	Time	Composition of armed terrorist group	Act carried out by armed terrorist group	Outcome	Remarks
10		0817	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Nabk, Mashrafah, Zabadani and Nashabiyah		
11		1000	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device was detonated and a law enforcement detachment came under fire in the Dayr Attiyah area		
12		1020	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Harmalah and Malihah		
13		1230	Armed terrorist group	Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Ali Adiba was killed at the Bayt Nayim turn-off on the Ghutah al-Sharqiyah road		
14		1730	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement checkpoint in the Jubbah area was attacked	One officer was injured	Fire was returned
15		1800	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Harmalah, at the Irbin-Qabun underpass in Dabaghat, and at the Zamalka-Qabun underpass		Fire was returned
16	Homs	2030	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in the city of Tall Kalakh		Fire was returned
17	Hama	2045	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards a law enforcement checkpoint in the Ghab area		
18		2120	Armed terrorist group	The Barudiyah law enforcement checkpoint in the city of Hama came under fire		
19	Aleppo	2230	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in Bab Antakiyah and three mortars were launched towards residential buildings in Bustan al-Qasr		Fire was returned

No.	*Place*	*Time*	*Composition of armed terrorist group*	*Acts carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
20		0100	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces came under fire from various types of weapon in Khan al-Asal		Fire was returned
21		0530	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces positioned in the Blarlirmun area on the Aleppo-I'zaz road came under fire from various types of weapon		Fire was returned
22		0730	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement forces barracks in Aleppo was targeted	One law enforcement officer was injured	Fire was returned
23		1000	Armed terrorist groups	Nahiyat al-Zarbah came under fire from machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and sniper fire		Fire was returned
24		1300	Armed terrorist group	A locally manufactured missile was fired towards the municipality building in the city of Aleppo	The building sustained material damage	
25		1340	Armed terrorist group	Mortars were fired towards the military checkpoint at the court house in the old city of Aleppo		
26	Idlib	0700	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces were attacked in the Hamidiyah and Ma'arrah areas, Harim, Salqin, the village of Allanah and in Jabal al-Duwali	Several law enforcement officers were killed and injured	Fire was returned
27		1400	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement forces were attacked at the turn-off for the village of Tarnabah on the Ariha-Saraqib road	Two law enforcement officers were killed and one other was injured	
28	Dayr al-Zawr	0600	Armed terrorist group	An oil pipeline was blown up in the Abu Kamal area		
29		1000	Armed terrorist group	A border guard position in the Bi'ajat area came under rocket attack	One border guard was killed and five others were injured	

List of infiltrations from the Lebanese side of the border by armed terrorist groups on 28 October 2012

No.	*Place*	*Time*		*Composition of armed terrorist group*	*Act carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1	Mazari' area	From 0500	To 0630	Armed terrorist group	In the Mazari' area, there was an attempt to infiltrate from Lebanese territory into Syrian territory and Syrian border guards came under fire		Fire was returned

United Nations A/67/576–S/2012/802

General Assembly
Security Council

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20 November 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 105
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 29 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith identical letters dated 29 October 2012 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (see annex).

The letters contain information about the activities of the armed terrorist groups in Syria and the States that provide them with support. These terrorist groups have increased their use of booby-trapped cars in their attacks, the most recent of which involved the explosion of a car bomb in the city of Jaramana, south of Damascus, on the morning of Monday, 29 October, which killed 11 individuals and injured more than 20.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item number 105, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-59819 (E) 261112 271112

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 29 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

This morning, Monday, 29 October 2012, the explosion of a booby-trapped vehicle shook a residential quarter of the Jaramana suburb in the south of Damascus. Eleven civilians were killed and more than 20 were injured, and buildings and shops in the area sustained severe damage. Jaramana is a suburb in which various denominations of Muslim and Christian Syrians live together.

That terrorist explosion was one of several destructive bombings that took place in Syria during Eid al-Adha, a period during which the Syrian Government had announced that it would halt military operations. The failure of the Security Council to condemn the first explosion, which took place in the Daff al-Shawk area, encouraged the terrorists to continue their crimes against the Syrian people.

Certain European and Western States members of the Security Council and the United States of America have on several occasions thwarted the release of Council statements condemning the bloody terrorism that has taken the lives of scores of children, women and older persons in Syria. The most recent occasion on which the Security Council was prevented from approving a statement against terrorism in Syria was when the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Security Council, blocked a statement that condemned a bombing perpetrated by terrorists in Daff al-Shawk, a neighbourhood of the Syrian capital Damascus, in which many were killed and injured and scores of buildings were destroyed. Such obstruction on the part of States which claim to fight international terrorism can only be construed as effectively fostering terrorism and its perpetrators. Every time the terrorist groups commit their crimes in Syria, States including the United States of America, France, Germany and the United Kingdom take it in turns to obstruct such steps. Their pretexts and infamous claims clearly point to an agenda that targets the Syrian people and their achievements and culture. Such abominable double standards prove that those States are not capable of shouldering their responsibilities in the Security Council and, indeed, that they frequently scorn the Council in order to serve their own narrow interests.

In two televised messages released on 25 October 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaida, called on those of his followers who are active in Syria to escalate their criminal butchery. He further instructed his adherents in the Islamic world to head for Syria in order to undertake jihad. The terrorist acts in Daff al-Shawk and against Syrian churches and mosques and religious figures were carried out pursuant to those instructions. Where is the Security Council when it comes to these crimes? Why are their perpetrators being protected by certain Council members?

On the instructions that they have received from their leaders who are living in Riyadh, Doha, Ankara, Istanbul, Paris and other capitals, the terrorist organizations murdered Father Fadi Haddad, the pastor of the Greek Orthodox church of Mar Elias in Qatana, and detonated a booby-trapped car in front of the Syriac church in Dayr al-Zawr. Those incidents were preceded by the savage terrorist attack on the

Umay ad mosque in Aleppo, which caused extensive material damage, and the attacks carried out by the terrorist groups on the first day of Eid al-Adha on a water pumping station in Aleppo, which disabled five pumps and cut the supply of drinking water to all the inhabitants of the western part of the city. All those and other crimes took place at a time when Syrian Arab law enforcement forces had made a specific commitment to halt operations and made no response to many of the attacks that were committed by terrorist groups in various parts of Syria. We informed the Security Council and the United Nations Secretary-General on a daily basis of the armed terrorist groups' violations of the Eid al-Adha ceasefires.

On 23 October 2012, as part of the genuine efforts to restore security and peace throughout Syria, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, His Excellency Bashar Al-Assad, declared the most comprehensive general amnesty in the history of Syria. It benefited thousands of Syrians who had been involved in the recent events and were able, after their release, to celebrate Eid al-Adha with their families and friends.

Syria implores Security Council member States and, in particular, those which fight terrorism without employing double standards, and all other States members of the United Nations, to condemn the terrorism through which the perpetrators and their protectors and financers, who arm and shelter them, are seeking to destroy and fragment Syria, abolish the unity of its people and territory and bring an end to its civilized and humane role.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2012/803

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 December 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 30 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and in reference to the agreement on a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha, and following my letters dated 26 to 28 October 2012, by transmitted lists of ceasefire violations committed by terrorist armed groups, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of the violations of the ceasefire committed by terrorist armed groups from Sunday, 28 October 2012 at 8 p.m. Syrian time until Monday, 29 October 2012, 8 p.m. Syrian time (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-66055 (E) 261212 271212

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 30 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

List of attacks and violations committed by the armed terrorist groups between 2000 hours on 28 October 2012 and 2000 hours on 29 October 2012

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1.	Damascus	0530	Armed terrorist group	Southern command headquarters came under mortar fire.		
2.		0850	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement forces position in Harasta came under mortar fire.		
3.	Rif Dimashq	2000	Armed terrorist groups	In Duma, law enforcement personnel came under fire from all types of weapon, including machine gun, sniper and mortar fire.		Fire was returned.
4.		2000	Armed terrorist groups	In Harasta, law enforcement personnel came under fire from all types of weapon.		Fire was returned.
5.		2000	Armed terrorist group	A vehicle taking food and provisions to law enforcement forces came under fire near the Rahmah petrol station.	The vehicle was damaged.	Fire was returned.
6.		2120	Armed terrorist group	The law enforcement checkpoint located close to the Mustafa mosque in Duma came under fire.		Fire was returned.

Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
7.	2130	Armed terrorist group	The checkpoint by the cemetery came under fire.		
8.	2130	Armed terrorist group	The Syrian checkpoint in Qatana came under fire.		
9.	2130	Armed terrorist group	The Ra's al-Nab' checkpoint in Qatana came under fire.		
10.	0700	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in Irbin were attacked with a variety of weapons.		Fire was returned.
11.	0830	Armed terrorist groups	The Harmalah checkpoint was attacked with a variety of weapons.		Fire was returned.
12.	0900	Armed terrorist group	The checkpoint at the Zamalka-Qabun underpass came under fire.		Fire was returned.
13.	0900	Armed terrorist group	The checkpoint at the Zamalka-Irbin underpass came under fire.		Fire was returned.
14.	1000	Armed terrorist groups	The Dabaghat checkpoint came under fire from a variety of weapons.		Fire was returned.
15.	1400	Armed terrorist groups	The following law enforcement checkpoints came under heavy machinegun and sniper fire: Harmalah, Dabaghat, the Irbin-Zamalka underpass and the Zamalka-Qabun underpass.	Two men were injured.	Fire was returned.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
16.		1450	Armed terrorist group	In Jaramanah, a booby-trapped car exploded in Rawdah Square and civilians came under fire.	Five civilians were killed, and 60 others were injured. Material damage was sustained by 64 vehicles and a number of buildings and commercial premises.	
17.		1500	Armed terrorist groups	In Duma and Harasta, law enforcement personnel were attacked with a variety of weapons.		There was a clash with the armed men.
18.		1600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints In Irbin came under heavy machinegun and sniper fire.	Six men were injured, including a second lieutenant.	Fire was returned.
19.	Rif Dimashq	1600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in the vicinity of the thermal station in Harran al-Awamid came under heavy machinegun and sniper fire.	Staff Sergeant Hasan Ibrahim and Sergeant Muhammad Sulaiman were killed and two other men were injured.	Fire was returned.
20		1645	Armed terrorist group	The Consumer Corporation checkpoint in Qatana came under fire.		Fire was returned.
21.		1700	Armed terrorist group	The police checkpoint in Qatana came under heavy fire.		Fire was returned.
22.		1715	Armed terrorist group	The Hallalah checkpoint came under fire from the direction of the Musallah al-Huda mosque.		Fire was returned.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
23.	Dar'a	2000	Armed terrorist group	Mortars were fired at a law enforcement forces position east of Nu'aymah.		Fire was returned.
24.		2000	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement checkpoints came under fire in the electricity company street in Hamidah al-Tahir.		Fire was returned.
25.		2000	Armed terrorist group	In Nu'aymah, the pedestrian footbridge position came under fire, including mortar fire.		Fire was returned.
26.		2000	Armed terrorist group	In Dar'a city centre, a law enforcement forces position by the engineers' building at the Sadd road crossroads came under fire.		Fire was returned.
27.		2015	Armed terrorist group	The southern Da'il checkpoint was attacked.		Fire was returned.
28.		2100	Armed terrorist group	The Shuhada' checkpoint to the east of Tall Sim'an came under attack.		Fire was returned.
29.		1450	Armed terrorist group	Border guards in Tall al-Bardakha were attacked.		Fire was returned.
30.	Homs	2000	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Qarabis came under fire.		
31.		2000	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Jurat al-Shayyah came under fire.		Fire was returned.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
32.		2000	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Talbisah came under fire.		
33.		2400	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Jubb al-Jandali came under fire.	One man was killed.	
34.		0200	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Khalidiyah came under fire.		
35.		0200	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel at the citadel came under heavy fire.		
36.		0300	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces in the Tall Kalakh area came under fire.		
37.		0500	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Bab Hud came under machinegun and sniper fire.		
38.		0600	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Dayr Ba'albah came under fire.		
39.	Homs	0800	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the vicinity of the Abbasin clinic came under fire.		
40.		1100	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Khandaq street came under heavy fire.		
41.	Hama	2000	Armed terrorist group	The checkpoints at the Bahrah and Sabahi roundabouts came under fire from an area to the west of the Khayrat mosque on the Aleppo road.		

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
42.		2135	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement forces in the Musaqi quarter came under fire from the east.		Fire was returned.
43.		0700	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement forces position in Bab al-Taqa in Qal'at al-Madiq came under machinegun and sniper fire.		Fire was returned.
44.		1310	Armed terrorist group	The law enforcement checkpoint located at the Ajzah roundabout came under fire from Juzdan street.		Fire was returned.
45.		1430	Armed terrorist group	The Ajzah roundabout came under fire and grenades were thrown from alleys nearby.		Fire was returned.
46.		1515	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement forces provisions vehicle came under fire as it was passing the Ajzah roundabout.		Fire was returned.
47.	Aleppo	2020	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the vicinity of the courthouse came under sniper and mortar fire.		Fire was returned.
48.		0030	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement forces came under fire from a variety of weapons on the Aleppo road, in I'zaz and in the Blalirmun area.		Fire was returned.
49.		0040	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces positioned at Shaykh Sa'id on the southern ring road came under fire from a variety of weapons.		The attack was repelled.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
50.		0100	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces positioned on the Aleppo-Atarib-Khan al-Asal road were targeted by snipers.	One man was injured.	Fire was returned.
51.		0300	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement forces positioned in Tilal street in the old city of Aleppo came under machinegun and sniper fire.		Fire was returned.
52.		1225	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement forces position at the Blalirmun turn-off on the Aleppo-I'zaz road was the target of locally-made missiles.		Fire was returned.
53.	Idlib	2030	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in Harim and Allanah came under fire.		Fire was returned.
54.		2100	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints in the Wadi al-Dayf region and Hamidiyah near Ma'arrat al-Nu'man came under fire.		Fire was returned.
55.		0600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel and civilians in Harim came under fire from a variety of weapons.	Numerous law enforcement personnel were killed and wounded and civilians loyal to the regime were massacred.	
56.		1015	Armed terrorist groups	The Tarnabah checkpoint near Mastumah came under fire.		Fire was returned.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
57.		1300	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement forces patrol came under fire as it was passing Basidah.		
58.		1430	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in Wadi al-Dayf, Hamidiyah and Allanah came under fire from a variety of weapons.		There was a clash with the armed men.
59.		1720	Armed terrorist groups	Taftanaz airport was attacked.		There was a clash with the armed men.
60.	Dayr al-Zawr	0720	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints in Dayr al-Zawr came under fire, including from rocket-propelled grenades.		Fire was returned.
61.		1020	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement forces unit was attacked in Dayr al-Zawr.		There was a clash with the armed men.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
13 December 2012
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 31 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letters dated 26, 27, 28 and 30 October 2012 concerning violations committed by the armed terrorist groups after the General Command of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces had announced that in observation of Eid al-Adha it would suspend military operations between Friday, 26 October and Monday, 29 October 2012, I should like to draw to your attention the following:

Albeit the General Command of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces was fully committed to the suspension of military operations during Eid al-Adha, while reserving the right to respond under the circumstances that were set forth in the statement that it issued on 25 October 2012, the armed terrorist groups perpetrated a series of violations that targeted the Armed Forces and law enforcement forces, civilians, and public and private property, and were responsible for numerous terrorist explosions in several Syrian cities during the Eid al-Adha holiday. We detailed those violations in the letters that were referred to above.

Set forth below is the extent to which the armed groups in various parts of Syria complied with the suspension of military operations:

In Rif Dimashq governorate, in the cities of Qadsiya and Bludan and the surrounding areas, compliance was 100 per cent and no military operations were undertaken even after the end of the Eid al-Adha holiday.

In Dar'a governorate, compliance was 70 per cent. A terrorist explosion took place in the vicinity of the railway station and the mobile phone transmission station.

In Homs governorate, compliance was 40 per cent.

In Hama governorate, compliance was 100 per cent in the city of Hama and 40 per cent in the surrounding rural areas.

In Idlib governorate there was no compliance whatsoever: on the contrary, the armed terrorist groups in the governorate tightened their blockade of the two towns of Harim and Salqin and prevented the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Red Crescent from providing any humanitarian assistance.

In Aleppo governorate, compliance was 30 per cent.

In Dayr al-Zawr governorate, compliance was 50 per cent. A terrorist explosion took place beside the Syrian Church.

It should be noted that the leaders of the armed terrorist organizations inside and outside Syria issued statements in which they rejected the announcement of the suspension of military operations and said that they would not comply with it. That rejection was reflected on the ground: those groups carried out a series of violations after the announcement of the suspension of military operations. The United Nations should, therefore, hold them clearly and unequivocally responsible and accountable for their actions. We should also like to draw attention to the fact that certain well-known States have maintained their overt involvement in the shedding of Syrian blood and thwarted any movement towards finding a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. Those States have continued to encourage the armed groups to persist in their aforementioned violations, provided them with all types of support, and deliberately maintained a media blackout of their terrorist and criminal acts and the violations which they perpetrated after the announcement of the suspension of military operations during Eid al-Adha. Furthermore, rather than tell the truth, they have conveyed an inflammatory and deceptive picture of what is taking place in Syria.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic

United Nations A/67/557–S/2012/805

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 November 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 105 and 113

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Identical letters dated 7 November 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 1 November 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden and myself, addressed to the President of the Security Council (see annex), and would like to request that the present letter and its annex be issued as a document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 105 and 113, and of the Security Council. The document will serve the broad interest of United Nations Member States, as it presents proposals on improving fair and clear procedures for a more effective United Nations sanctions system.

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-58219 (E) 191112

Please recycle

Annex to the letters dated 7 November 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

We, the undersigned representatives of Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (the Group of Like-minded States on Targeted Sanctions), are writing to you on the issue of Security Council sanctions.

The members of the Group of Like-minded States on Targeted Sanctions are strongly committed to the effective implementation of the Council's sanctions regimes. We closely follow the developments with regard to the Al-Qaida sanctions regime established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and commend the Security Council for the important steps that were taken in the past few years for a more independent and effective sanctions review mechanism. We are convinced that by further improving fair and clear procedures, the Security Council will render the work of the Al-Qaida sanctions Committee more effective and legitimate and thus considerably strengthen it as a counter-terrorism instrument. We are also convinced that the benefits of the Ombudsperson process of the 1267/1989 sanctions regime should be extended to other relevant sanctions regimes. The attached paper, entitled "Improving fair and clear procedures for a more effective United Nations sanctions system", spells out our proposals in this regard.

We hope that the Council will find interest in these ideas, in particular in the context of the upcoming consultations and negotiations in preparation for the adoption of a follow-up resolution to resolution 1989 (2011).

We look forward to continuing and deepening the dialogue on this important matter with all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Martin **Sajdik**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Jan **Grauls**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Eduardo **Ulibarri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Carsten **Staur**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Jarmo **Viinanen**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Peter **Wittig**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Christian **Wenaweser**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Herman **Schaper**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Geir O. **Pedersen**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Marten **Grunditz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

Enclosure

Improving fair and clear procedures for a more effective United Nations sanctions system

Introduction

Targeted sanctions continue to serve as an important tool for the United Nations Security Council in exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In previous years, the Security Council has taken significant steps to enhance fair and clear procedures within the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. In particular, the establishment and strengthening of the Ombudsperson process by resolutions 1904 (2009) and 1989 (2011) were important steps towards an independent and effective sanctions review mechanism.

Since her appointment on 3 June 2010, Ombudsperson Kimberly Prost has been petitioned with requests for delisting in more than 33 cases. Out of those cases 19 delisting decisions have so far been taken by the Committee, including the recent delisting of Yassin Abdullah Kadi on 5 October 2012. These numbers highlight the important contribution of the Office of the Ombudsperson to making the list of the Al-Qaida sanctions Committee more accurate and more legitimate.

Nonetheless, regional and national legal challenges to the Al-Qaida sanctions regime and its implementation persist. The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Nada case, for instance, stated that United Nations sanctions do not prevent judicial review of the domestic implementation of sanctions. However, if domestic lawsuits of such cases indeed lead to national delistings, the uniform application of and full compliance with United Nations sanctions will be at stake. As long as courts and parliaments perceive sanctions procedures as not satisfying the basic elements of rule of law and due process, the implementation of the Al-Qaida sanctions regime will continue to be challenged.

Similar due process concerns exist in the context of other targeted sanctions regimes of the Security Council. The recent United Nations General Assembly High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law encouraged the Security Council to further develop fair and clear procedures without limitation to a particular sanctions regime. The Security Council should therefore start contemplating on how the benefits of the Office of the Ombudsperson could be extended beyond the Al-Qaida sanctions regime to other relevant sanctions committees.

The Group of Like-minded States remains convinced that by further improving fair and clear procedures, the Security Council will render the work of its sanctions regimes more effective and legitimate. It is in this perspective that we invite the Security Council to take into consideration the following common suggestions by the Group of Like-minded States on Targeted Sanctions.

1. Proposals to further enhance fair and clear delisting procedures: strengthening the Ombudsperson process

1.1. Enhanced cooperation of States with the Ombudsperson for information gathering

Member States shall timely provide the Ombudsperson with all relevant information on persons and entities applying for delisting, including confidential and classified information or declassified documents

The Security Council should encourage Member States to conclude confidentiality agreements and arrangements with the Ombudsperson. The Security Council should also urge Member States to abide by the time limits as set forth in annex II of resolution 1989 (2011).

The Ombudsperson should bring cases of specific as well as of persistent non-cooperation of a State to the attention of the Committee and ask for its assistance. In addition, the Ombudsperson should address lack of compliance by Member States in her biannual reports.

The effectiveness of the Ombudsperson's work and her ability to provide detailed information and thorough analysis and observations to assist the Committee hinges upon the cooperation of States. Paragraph 25 of resolution 1989 (2011), which urges Member States to provide all relevant information, has proven useful to encourage States to cooperate with the Ombudsperson. Nonetheless, in a substantial number of cases Member States do not or only belatedly respond to requests for information by the Ombudsperson. The timely provision of relevant information is fundamental to the overall fairness of the process and the Ombudsperson can base her recommendation solely on information available to her.

1.2. Codification of the Ombudsperson practice

The standards for review of delisting requests should be transparent and spelled out in greater detail in the resolution that guides the work of the Ombudsperson. In order to ensure coherence, predictability and continuity, the following principles should be enshrined in the future mandate of the Ombudsperson:

(a) The Ombudsperson can base her recommendation only on information provided or available to her. If no or insufficient information is available, the Ombudsperson shall recommend delisting;

(b) The Ombudsperson should continue to base her recommendations on current and up-to-date information, examining whether the listing is justified as of the day of the examination of the delisting request, which is different from a historical review of the accuracy of the listing on the day of the Committee's decision to create a new list entry. The upcoming resolution should also specify that the comprehensive report shall outline whether sufficient information is available that provides a reasonable and credible basis to assess whether the listing criteria are still fulfilled;

(c) Information obtained under torture or through other illegal means should not be admissible to the process.

Domestic, regional and international courts and tribunals need legal certainty in order to assess whether the Ombudsperson process constitutes an effective remedy for the affected individuals and entities. The Council should therefore clarify the standards according to which the Ombudsperson shall deal with requests for delisting.

1.3. Transparency of the delisting process

1.3.1. Procedural transparency

The Office of the Ombudsperson shall inform the petitioner upon request about the state of play of his or her request for delisting where necessary to ensure the transparency of the process.

Practice has shown that in many instances petitioners approach the Ombudsperson in order to be informed about how their request for delisting is being processed. It is a feature of fairness and would enhance confidence of petitioners in the delisting process, if the Ombudsperson were given explicit powers to inform the persons concerned about the state of play of their requests.

1.3.2. Material transparency

1.3.2.1. Reasoning of Committee decisions

All Committee decisions, regardless of whether they maintain a listing or delist an individual or entity, should contain adequate and substantial reasons. The Ombudsperson shall convey these reasons to the petitioner.

The reasons for delisting and maintaining a list entry in one case may be important in assessing other cases. It is therefore important that the Ombudsperson know about the specific reasons behind a Committee decision. Also, the petitioner must be informed about these reasons, not least in order to be able to change behaviour and to finally be able to successfully request delisting.

1.3.2.2. Publication of a releasable summary of the comprehensive report

A releasable summary of the comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson should be published. Thereby, private and confidential information should be adequately protected.

A releasable summary of the comprehensive report of the Ombudsperson would enhance the transparency of the Ombudsperson process. The publication of the releasable summary is particularly important in cases where the Ombudsperson recommends maintaining a listing since her findings might be essential in relevant national or regional court proceedings.

1.4. Extension of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson

The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson should be extended to an unlimited period. The mandate should be reviewed every 18 months.

A prolongation of the mandate of the Office without limitation would give more weight and credibility to the Ombudsperson's work, enhance her independence and solve important administrative hurdles such as the funding of the Office.

Nevertheless, a regular review of the mandate is necessary in order to adjust the Office to new and changing developments.

1.5. Administrative issues

The Office of the Ombudsperson should be timely provided with all resources necessary to fulfil her mandate, including funds for translation and interpretation. The general guidelines as to word limits for translation, applicable to parliamentary documents in the United Nations system, should not be applied to the comprehensive reports of the Ombudsperson.

Translation and interpretation in all relevant languages is an essential feature of due process. Absent sufficient resources and funds for interpretation and translation, the communication between the Ombudsperson and the petitioner can be impeded. In addition, the word limitation infringes on the independence of the Ombudsperson.

1.6. Enlarging the scope of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson

1.6.1. Competence of the Ombudsperson to transmit requests for humanitarian exemptions

The Office of the Ombudsperson should be entitled to transmit requests for humanitarian exemptions by listed individuals or entities to the Committee within two working days. In the absence of a negative decision within three working days, the Committee should authorize such requests and the Ombudsperson should be entitled to notify the decision of the Committee to the petitioner and the State(s) concerned.

Under the current system, the responsibility of advancing an individual's request for humanitarian exemptions lies with the Member States, which may not wish to present exemption requests to the Committee or may lack the resources to do so. In order to guarantee full respect for fundamental rights, individuals and entities themselves should also have the right to petition for an exemption through the Ombudsperson.

1.6.2. Competence of the Ombudsperson to assist persons or entities who are unintendedly affected by the sanctions regime

The Ombudsperson should, when such cases are brought to her attention, have the mandate to assist in monitoring and follow-up on cases of persons or entities who face unintended problems owing to the sanctions regime, such as delisted persons and persons with the same names as listed entries. In particular, the Ombudsperson should have the competence to submit to the consideration of the Committee proposals for documents of negative identification and documents certifying a delisting. Those documents, after approval by the Committee, could then be used by the concerned persons as evidence for not being subject to Security Council sanctions.

In several cases of individuals delisted by the Committee through the Ombudsperson process, the delisted person has approached the Ombudsperson and claimed that he/she is still subject to the application of sanction measures, even after the delisting. The Ombudsperson should assist in such cases.

2. Proposals for more just and effective listings: increasing the transparency of the listing process and introducing time limits to all listings

2.1. Clarification of listing criteria

The Security Council should offer standards of legal clarity as to what amounts to "supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof" and may result in a listing under the 1267/1989 sanctions regime.

Paragraph 4 of resolution 1989 (2011) defines the acts and activities that indicate that an association with Al-Qaida exists. These acts and activities constitute the criteria for listing and are therefore the nucleus of the Al-Qaida sanctions regime. For reasons of legal certainty and predictability those criteria should meet certain standards of legal clarity, not least to allow affected individuals, groups, undertakings or entities to change their behaviour in order to become delisted. Given the broad scope of the term "otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida" in paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 1989 (2011), the Council should specify and exemplify possible supporting acts or activities other than recruitment, such as for instance acts of incitement to terrorism.

2.2. Disclosure of designating State

When necessary to the fairness of the process, the Ombudsperson may, upon request, inform the petitioner about the identity of the designating State.

As of now, the identity of the designating State or States is confidential and the Ombudsperson can only disclose the information after seeking and obtaining the consent of the relevant designating State or States (see resolution 1989 (2011), para. 29, urges but does not oblige relevant States to reveal their identity). The non-disclosure of the identity of the designating States remains an impediment to the delivery of effective due process, because the petitioner may face a significant disadvantage in answering a case without knowing the identity of the State or States that proposed the listing. Furthermore, listed individuals and entities will not be able to access the delisting procedure through the designating State if the latter is not known to them.

2.3. Time limits for all listings

The Security Council should require that after the periodic triennial review each listing must be actively confirmed by the Committee in order to remain on the list. Thereby, the Committee should give reasons why a listing remains appropriate.

Introducing a time limit to all listings would underline the preventive and temporary nature of the sanctions measures.

3. Looking beyond the Al-Qaida sanctions Committee: improving due process in other sanctions Committees

3.1. Extension of the mandate of the Ombudsperson to other sanctions regimes

The important procedural safeguards of the Ombudsperson process should be gradually extended to other appropriate sanctions regimes, in particular those with broad criteria for listing. Accordingly, consideration should be given to equip the Office of the Ombudsperson with adequate resources.

Only individuals and entities listed on the Al-Qaida sanctions list currently have access to the Ombudsperson process. Yet, similar due process concerns exist in other United Nations Security Council sanctions regimes. Some of the so-called country-specific sanctions regimes do not in fact target a country or its regime and its policies. Instead, they target persons, groups and entities, in stark and often violent opposition to the internationally recognized Government and its policies. Thus, they do not enjoy the modicum of protection of their rights and interests that a Government with access to diplomatic channels and representation at the United Nations would normally offer. Persons listed under those Security Council sanctions regimes have also started to challenge their listing under legal acts implementing Security Council designations. The Security Council should therefore consider the extension of the competence of the Office of the Ombudsperson to other regimes on the occasion of their next mandate renewals.

3.2. Extension of the "holds-procedure" time limits adopted by the 1267/1989 Committee to other sanctions regimes

The Security Council should direct all sanctions Committees to amend their guidelines to ensure that no matter is left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that extraordinary circumstances require additional time for consideration. Accordingly, all sanctions Committees should amend their guidelines following the model of the guidelines of the 1267/1989 Committee.

The right to have cases decided within reasonable time is an essential element of due process. The past practice in the 1267/1989 Committee of placing holds on proposed decisions, some of which were left undecided for years, was successfully put to an end in 2010. Extending time limits for placing holds on proposed decisions to all sanctions Committees would be an important element of due process and would significantly strengthen the fairness and the transparency of decision-making in all sanctions Committees.

United Nations S/2012/806

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 27 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and in reference to the agreement on a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha, and following my letters dated 25 October 2012, in which I transmitted lists of ceasefire violations committed by armed terrorist groups on 26 October 2012 up to 2000 hours, I have the honour to inform that the Syrian Arab Republic Army and the Armed Forces have abided fully through the cessation of military operations on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, starting from the morning of the first day of Eid al-Adha, 26 October 2012. Nevertheless, many armed terrorist groups announced that they would not commit to the ceasefire, and consequently, they continue their terrorist activities and attacks on civilians and public and private properties.

At the same time, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the terrorist group Al-Qaida, issued a statement in which he directed Al-Qaida terrorist members in Syria not only to continue in their fight, but also to escalate their operations. This statement, which was publicized by many media outlets, led to an unprecedented increase in the activities of armed terrorist groups and violations of the ceasefire in most governorates of Syria. In addition, there has been a big increase in number of explosions conducted by those terrorist groups of booby-trapped cars in Dara, Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and Rif Dimashq resulting in the death of many innocent civilians.

I attach herewith a list of violations of the ceasefire committed by the armed terrorist groups up to 1400 hours, 27 October 2012 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-59244 (E) 211112 211112

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Annex to the identical letters dated 27 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

List of attacks and violations carried out by the armed terrorist groups up to 1400 hours on Saturday, 27 October 2012

No	*Place*	*Time*	*Constituents of armed terrorist group*	*Act carried out by armed terrorist group*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1	Rif Dimashq	2000	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement checkpoints came under attack from all types of weapon in Burj al-Tibb, at the Martyrs', Abdulru'uf and Municipality roundabouts, and at the Sindiyanah and Shayfuniyah turn-offs in the Duma area		The clashes are continuing
2		2000	Armed terrorist groups	All the law enforcement checkpoints in Harasta were attacked with all types of weapon		The clashes are continuing
3		2000	Armed terrorist group	A military barracks in Jub'adin in the Hawsh al-Arab region came under fire		Fire was returned
4		2030	Armed terrorist group	The Ra's al-Nab' checkpoint and personnel guarding housing in Qatana came under fire		
5		2100	Armed terrorist group	The Siryan checkpoint in Qatana came under fire		
6		2100	Armed terrorist group	The Consumer Corporation checkpoint in Qatana came under fire		
7		0830	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device was planted in Kafr Quq		The device was defused

No.	Place	Time	Constituents of armed terrorist group	Act carried out by armed terrorist group	Outcome	Remarks
8		1130	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device was planted 300 metres east of the Tawafiq residential complex roundabout in Qatana		The device was defused
9	Dar'a	2200	Armed terrorist group	The Namir checkpoint was attacked from the direction of the village of Qarfah		
10		1300	Armed terrorist group	The military barracks in Dar'a came under sniper fire	A major was injured	
11	Homs	2230	Armed terrorist group	Fire was directed towards the Jubb al-Jarah checkpoint in the Mukharram region	One officer was injured	Fire was returned
12		0220	Armed terrorist group	Armed men reinforced their positions in the Haydariyah area north of Dab'ah airport		There was a clash with the armed men
13		0500	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Bab Hud came under sniper and rocket-propelled grenade fire		
14	Hama	2030	Armed terrorist group	The Abraj al-Hamzah checkpoint came under fire		
15		2250	Armed terrorist group	The Nawa'ir al-Arba'ah checkpoint in the city of Hama came under fire		Fire was returned
16		2315	Armed terrorist group	The Jubb roundabout and Junub al-Mal'ab swimming pool checkpoints came under fire		
17		2330	Armed terrorist group	The new party branch building and police headquarters came under fire		

No.	Place	Time	Constituents of armed terrorist group	Act carried out by armed terrorist group	Outcome	Remarks
18	Aleppo	0930	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel were attacked by hand grenades and Molotov cocktails in the Khan al-Wazir post office area in the old city of Aleppo		
19		0945	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement position in Kafr Hamrah on the Aleppo-I'zaz road came under fire from various types of weapon		There was a clash with the armed men
20		1000	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel positioned at Khan al-Asal on the Aleppo-Atarib road were attacked by machine gun and sniper fire		There was a clash with the armed men
21		1020	Armed terrorist groups	A law enforcement checkpoint in the Jubb al-Shaykh Sa'id area on the Aleppo-Raqqah road came under fire from various types of weapon		There was a clash with the armed men
22		1130	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel were attacked by grenades and Molotov cocktails in the Farafirah quarter		Fire was returned
23	Idlib	0330	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in Suq al-Sakan al-Shababi		Fire was returned
24		0600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in Wadi al-Dayf, Hamidiyah, Harim, Salqin and Allanah came under fire from various types of weapon		There was a clash with the armed men which is continuing
25		0600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel in Harim and Salqin were attacked		There was a clash with the armed men

No	Place	Time	Constituents of armed terrorist group	Act carried out by armed terrorist group	Outcome	Remarks
26		0600	Armed terrorist group	Two explosive devices, one of which weighed 50-80 kg, were planted on the Idlib-Salqin road		The devices were defused
27		0900	Armed terrorist group	An explosive device estimated to weigh some 20 kg was detonated in the vicinity of the Carlton Hotel in the city of Idlib	Two children were injured	
28	Dayr al-Zawr	0500	Armed terrorist group	After a large explosion, law enforcement personnel in Jubaylah and Rushdiyah were targeted by heavy fire and rocket-propelled grenades	Four officers were injured	Fire was returned
29		0500	Armed terrorist group	A booby-trapped car exploded and at the same time fire was directed towards an area in which 466 branch forces were undertaking military activity	Material damage	
30		0615	Armed terrorist group	A booby-trapped car exploded between the Syrian church and the regional leadership building	The old regional leadership building completely collapsed and the part of the church beside it also collapsed	
31	Rif Dimashq	2014	Armed terrorist group	Military checkpoints in Qatana came under heavy fire		Fire was returned
32	Homs	2010	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Tall Kalakh came under fire	Staff Sergeant Malath Muhsin al-Ramadan was killed	

United Nations S/2012/807

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 December 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 27 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and in reference to the agreement on a ceasefire during Eid al-Adha and following my letters dated 26 and 27 October 2012, to which I attached a list of ceasefire violations committed by the armed terrorist groups, I have the honour to attach herewith a list of all the violations of the ceasefire committed by armed terrorist groups from 8 p.m. Syrian time, 26 October, until 8 p.m. Syrian time, 27 October (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-65432 (E) 261212 271212

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 27 October 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

List of attacks and violations committed by the armed terrorist groups between 2000 hours on 26 October 2012 and 2000 hours on 27 October 2012

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
1.	Rif Dimashq	2000	Armed terrorist groups	In Duma, law enforcement personnel came under fire from all types of weapon in Burj al-Tibb, at the Shuhada, Abdaru'uf and Baladiyah roundabouts, and at the Sindiyanah and Shayfuniyah turn-offs.		Clashes are continuing.
2.		2000	Armed terrorist groups	All the law enforcement checkpoints in Harasta were attacked with a variety of weapons.		Clashes are continuing.
3.		2000	Armed terrorist group	In the Hawsh Arab area, a military barracks came under fire in Jub 'adin.		Fire was returned.
4.		2030	Armed terrorist group	The Ra's al-Nab' checkpoint and personnel guarding housing in Qatana came under fire.		
5.		2100	Armed terrorist group	The Siriyan checkpoint in Qatana came under fire.		
6.		2100	Armed terrorist group	The Consumer Corporation checkpoint in Qatana came under fire.		
7.		0600	Armed terrorist groups	The Habaghat, Harmalah, Irbin-Qabun underpass and Zamalka-Qabun underpass checkpoints came under machine gun and sniper fire.	Two men were injured.	Fire was returned.
8.		0830	Armed terrorist group	An incendiary device was planted at the Kafr Quq crossroads.		It was defused.

	Place	Time	Composition of terrorist group	Acts committed by armed terrorist groups	Outcome	Remarks
9.		1130	Armed terrorist group	An incendiary device was planted 300 m to the east of the Tawafiq housing roundabout in Qatana.		It was defused.
10.		1130	Armed terrorist group	Personnel at the Dukhaniyah checkpoint came under fire, including from rocket-propelled grenades.		Fire was returned.
11.		1230	Armed terrorist group	Personnel at the Jisr Zamalka checkpoint came under fire, including from rocket-propelled grenades.		Fire was returned.
12.		1230	Armed terrorist group	Personnel at the Ayn Tarma checkpoint came under fire, including from rocket-propelled grenades.	One man was injured.	Fire was returned.
13.		1300	Armed terrorist group	Personnel at the Jisr Zamalka checkpoint came under fire, including from rocket-propelled grenades.		Fire was returned.
14.	Dar'a	2200	Armed terrorist group	The Namir checkpoint came under fire from the direction of the village of Qarfah.		
15.		1300	Armed terrorist group	A military barracks in Dar'a came under sniper fire.	Major Abdulmawla Ja'far was killed	
16.	Homs	2230	Armed terrorist group	There was firing in the direction of the Jubb al-Jarah checkpoint in the Makhrum area.	One man was injured.	Fire was returned.
17.		0230	Armed terrorist group	Armed men reinforced their positions in the Haydariyah area north of Dab'ah airport.		There was a clash with the armed men.
18.		0500	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in Bab Hud came under sniper and rocket-propelled grenade fire.		
19.	Hama	2030	Armed terrorist group	The Abraj al-Hamza checkpoint came under fire.		

	Place	Time	Composition of terrorist group	Acts committed by armed terrorist groups	Outcome	Remarks
20.		2250	Armed terrorist group	The al-Nawa'ir al-Arba'ah checkpoint in Hama city came under fire.		Fire was returned.
21.		2215	Armed terrorist group	The two checkpoints at the Jubb roundabout and the Junub al-Mal'ab swimming pool came under fire.		
22.		2330	Armed terrorist group	The building housing the new Party branch and the Police Command came under fire.		
23.		0145	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement checkpoint came under fire in the Hayy al-Samak quarter.		
24.	Aleppo	0930	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the Khan al-Wazir post office area in the old city of Aleppo came under attack from hand grenades and Molotov cocktails.		
25.		0945	Armed terrorist groups	The law enforcement position at Kafr al-Hamra' on the Aleppo-A'zaz road came under attack from a variety of weapons.		There was a clash with the armed men.
26.		1000	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel positioned at Khan al-Asal on the Aleppo-Atarib road came under machine-gun and sniper fire.		There was a clash with the armed men.
27.		2030	Armed terrorist groups	The law enforcement position at Jisr al-Shaykh Sa'id on the Aleppo-Raqqah road came under attack from a variety of weapons.		There was a clash with the armed men.
28.		1130	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the Farafirah quarter came under attack from grenades and Molotov cocktails.		Fire was returned.
29.		1300	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the Aqabah area of the old city of Aleppo came under fire.		Fire was returned.

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
30.		1330	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the vicinity of the Umayyad Mosque in the old city of Aleppo came under fire.		Fire was returned.
31.		1335	Armed terrorist group	The Russian media delegation that was heading towards the Umayyad Mosque came under fire.	The delegation was unable to reach the Umayyad Mosque.	Fire was returned.
32.		1530	Armed terrorist group	A law enforcement forces food transportation vehicle came under fire as it was passing the Aleppo-A'zaz crossroads.	One man was injured.	
33.	Idlib	0330	Armed terrorist group	Law enforcement personnel in the Shababi housing complex market came under fire.		Fire was returned.
34.		0600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel came under fire from a variety of weapons in Wadi al-Dayf, Hamidiyah, Harim, Salqin and Allanah.		There was a clash with the armed men, which is continuing.
35.		0600	Armed terrorist groups	Law enforcement personnel were attacked in Harim and Salqin.		There was a clash with the armed men.
36.		0600	Armed terrorist group	Two incendiary devices, one of which weighed between 50 and 80 kg, were planted on the Idlib-Salqin road.		They were defused.
37.		0900	Armed terrorist group	An incendiary device estimated to weigh some 20 kg was detonated in the vicinity of the Carlton Hotel in the city of Idlib.	Two children were injured.	
38.		1030	Armed terrorist group	Two incendiary devices were detonated near the Markaziyah pharmacy in al-Furn al-Gharbi, Idlib city.		

	Place	*Time*	*Composition of terrorist group*	*Acts committed by armed terrorist groups*	*Outcome*	*Remarks*
39.	Dayr al-Zawr	0500	Armed terrorist group	There was heavy firing, including from rocket-propelled grenades, after law enforcement personnel in Jubaylah and Rushdiyah had been targeted by a large explosion.	Four men were injured.	Fire was returned.
40.		0500	Armed terrorist group	A booby-trapped car exploded and at the same time, fire was directed towards an area in which 46th branch forces were undertaking military activity.	There was material damage.	
41.		0615	Armed terrorist group	A booby-trapped car exploded in the area between the Syrian church and the regional command building.	The old regional command building completely collapsed and the part of the church and the houses beside it also collapsed.	